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International Law Adrift: Forum Shopping, Forum
Rejection, and the Future of Maritime
Dispute Resolution
Douglas W. Gates ∗

Abstract
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea is the primary
international agreement governing maritime law. It incorporated a feature that, at the time, was
considered to be on the leading edge of international legal development: a binding dispute resolution
system. At the time of accession, each state party was required to select one of four available
forums: the International Court of Justice, the newly created International Tribunal on the Law
of the Sea, private arbitration, or special tribunals convened to resolve unique scientific and
environmental matters.
Since the Convention went into effect in 1994, however, states have made little use of
the system; many have resolved issues through private negotiation or have simply allowed legal
conflicts to endure. Moreover, less than a quarter of parties to the 1982 Convention have selected
a preferred forum. Among the relatively small set of cases that have been heard, however, patterns
have begun to emerge that contain hints about how states engage in forum shopping in the
maritime context.
This Comment conducts a comprehensive analysis of existing case law and tests various
academic theories about forum shopping to determine why states opt for each of the various courts
or tribunals when submitting a dispute for resolution under the Convention. It finds that subject
matter is the best predictor of forum selection, as each forum has made use of comparative
advantages to gain a foothold in particular areas of the law. The Comment also notes a worrying
trend in non-participation by major powers, including Russia, China, and the U.S. If the great
powers of the world reject the compulsory nature of the system, UNCLOS will become less effective
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at channeling tensions into peaceful resolutions. This will increase the risk that states will resort
to the use of force to solve disputes.
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I. I NTRODUCTION
Imagine: In 2019, maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas remain
unresolved. As part of the promised renegotiation of the “trade deal” between the
U.S. and China, Washington agrees to discontinue its military patrols in China’s
near seas in return for a Chinese agreement not to pursue trade remedies at the
World Trade Organization (WTO) for new American tariffs on manufactured
goods. The Philippines and Thailand are firmly ensconced in the Chinese sphere
of influence: American ships no longer call in their ports and Chinese cash flows
to the bank accounts of their politicians. Vietnam and Japan continue to resist
Chinese dominance in the Asian littoral, but their cause seems more dire by the
day. China declares large parts of the high seas off-limits to foreign militaries and
subjects foreign-flagged commercial vessels to arbitrary inspections.
In an effort to appeal to the international community, Tokyo and Hanoi file
legal claims under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS or Convention), the premier international agreement governing such
disputes. 1 When it was first negotiated in 1982 and finally came into effect in
1994, 2 UNCLOS’s various features, including its binding dispute resolution
system, were considered to be at the leading edge of international law. 3 Part XV
of the Convention offers several choices of forum to resolve disputes. 4 How, then,
might a state strategize to pick the optimal forum? Did any of the countries
involved select a preferred venue when they ratified the Convention? Is there any
forum that is particularly well suited to this area of maritime law? Might any one
type of procedure give the petitioners an advantage?
This particular dispute, however, comes with a twist. Recalling how China
ignored an adverse arbitral award by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA)
in 2016, 5 Japan and Vietnam take their cases to internationally established courts:
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) and the International
Court of Justice (ICJ). Both claims succeed on the merits, and the courts issue
strong condemnations of China’s actions. However, following the precedent it set
1

See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397
[hereinafter UNCLOS].

2

See Section II, infra.
See Donald R. Rothwell, Building on the Strengths and Addressing Challenges: The Role of the Law of the Sea
Institutions, 35 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 131, 131–32 (2004) (“The Convention remains a shining
example of international cooperation, diplomacy, and the role of international law in the regulation
of international affairs and is considered to be one of the most complex and ultimately successful
international diplomatic negotiations that took place in the 20th century.”).

3

4
5

See UNCLOS, supra note 1, at art. 279–99.
The South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), Perm. Ct. Arb. Case No. 2013-19, Award of July
12, 2016.

Summer 2017

289

Chicago Journal of International Law

before and the pattern of behavior of the world’s other major military powers,
China maintains course. The Convention, which represented the culmination of
centuries of legal developments to open the seas to all, has no effect on the sudden
closure and balkanization of shipping lanes in East Asia. 6
This scenario may never come to pass. Countries regularly make use of
UNCLOS’s advanced, binding dispute resolution system. At the time of writing,
eight cases are pending before three separate bodies under the Convention,
contributing to a budding field of case law interpreting and applying the
Convention that has developed over the past two decades. Although scholars have
analyzed the forum selection process, 7 several new developments have occurred
within the last few years that necessitate another look. Tribunals have begun to
emerge from the niches they created for themselves early on, and individual states
have experimented with using more than one forum to resolve longstanding
debates with their neighbors.
However, the future is uncertain. The U.S. has never ratified the Convention
due to domestic opposition. 8 Meanwhile, Russia and China, both signatories for
nearly two decades, 9 have rolled back their commitment to international legal
tribunals by refusing to participate in the binding resolution of disputes—or even
the proceedings that produce those resolutions—in the last four years. 10 As the
three largest military powers in the world and most important actors in the U.N.
Security Council, their continued opposition to the Convention creates a worrying
trend for international law. Their refusal to abide by judgments issued by legally
constituted forums sets a precedent for smaller nations to disregard binding
rulings, relegating the Convention’s method of resolving disputes to obscurity and
encouraging powerful states to impose terms on their weaker neighbors.

6
7

8

9

10

See Section II, infra.
See generally Rothwell, supra note 3; Sicco Rah & Tilo Wallrabenstein, The International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea and Its Future, 21 OCEAN Y.B. 41 (2007); Rosemary Rayfuse, The Future of Compulsory
Dispute Settlement Under the Law of the Sea Convention, 36 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 683
(2005); Helmut Tuerk, The Contribution of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea to International
Law, 26 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 289 (2007). Tuerk served as an ITLOS judge, and his work
cataloguing the case law through 2007 remains the best piece on this subject. This Comment will
repeat portions of his analysis and attempt to update the law as it has developed in the intervening
decade.
See, for example, Steven Groves, The Law of the Sea: Costs of U.S. Accession to UNCLOS—Hearing Before
the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (June 14, 2012),
https://perma.cc/48ZE-6C6Q; see also The United Nations Law of the Sea Treaty Information Center,
NAT’L CTR. FOR PUB. POL’Y RES., https://perma.cc/839G-X57J (last visited Mar. 19, 2017).
China ratified UNCLOS on June 7, 1996; Russia ratified on Mar. 12, 1997. See Chronological Lists of
Ratifications of, Accessions and Successions to the Convention and the Related Agreements, U.N. DIVISION FOR
OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA (2017), https://perma.cc/2UCC-YYNJ.
See Section IV, infra.
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This Comment conducts a comprehensive examination of every case
decided under Part XV to date. Section II briefly reviews the development of
international maritime law in the modern era. It argues that the law has attempted
to balance the interests of both coastal states and shipping nations over the course
of time, but that the current rules have swung in favor of coastal states. Section
III presents an overview of the Convention as it exists today. It summarizes the
cases decided under Part XV and evaluates various theories on how states shop
for the best forums against the record of cases that has accumulated over the past
two decades. It finds that the forum selection process that the framers of the
Convention designed has little effect on actual practice. Instead, international legal
tribunals have gained subject-matter expertise in narrow areas of law that are
frequently litigated, while all other subject areas usually default to arbitration.
Section IV identifies the most notable trend in the system’s recent past: forum
rejection. Several major military powers have refused to participate in legal
proceedings under Part XV, rejecting the jurisdiction of any forum over certain
issues. This trend creates a serious problem and is likely to lead to less reliance on
binding dispute resolution, leaving disputes to linger and incentivizing powerful
states to intimidate their weaker neighbors to achieve their goals. In light of
continued American opposition to international legal dispute resolution
mechanisms, this trend may continue unabated.

II. M ARE L IBERUM : 400 Y EARS OF O PEN S EAS
For more than two thousand years, Western law has recognized that the
oceans and other waterways are res communes—things that are common to all
persons and therefore incapable of being owned. 11 Justinian observed that “the
air, running water, [and] the sea” are “by natural law common to all.” 12 The natural
division between private and communal property respects the unique
characteristics of waterways and their critical role in socially beneficial commerce:
By keeping waterways in the commons . . . the law facilitate[s] transportation
between owners of different parcels of private property. To allow any person
to privatize a [waterway] would disrupt these valuable forms of interactions,
which would then paradoxically reduce the value of all private properties that
lie along the commons. 13

However, the law’s commitment to such a system has wavered over the
centuries. For example, in seventeenth century Germany, several small fiefdoms
11
12
13

See J. INST. 2.1.2. (J.B. Moyle trans., 1911).
Id.
Richard A. Epstein, What is So Special About Intangible Property?: The Case for Intelligent Carryovers, in
COMPETITION POLICY AND PATENT LAW UNDER UNCERTAINTY: REGULATING INNOVATION 45
(G. Manne & J. Robert Wright eds., 2011).
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arose along the length of the Rhine; each charged its own tax, which “cut sharply
into [the river’s] value for transportation and commerce.” 14 The Treaty of
Westphalia of 1648 solved the problem by explicitly banning the imposition of
tolls and reopening river commerce for the benefit of the whole society. 15
Although the principle of free navigation of the seas dates back millennia,
the modern law of the sea began with the resurgence of European shipping in the
seventeenth century. In 1608, Hugo Grotius published the Dutch position in his
seminal work, Mare Liberum. 16 Writing in response to Portuguese efforts to close
trade routes to the East Indies to other European nations, Grotius insisted that
the nature of the oceans made it illegitimate for any state to claim their sovereign
control. 17 The core of his argument recalled the Roman understanding of natural
law, arguing that “freedom of trade is based on a primitive right of nations which
has a natural and permanent cause; and so that right cannot be destroyed.” 18
Grotius’ counterpart in England, John Selden, replied with Mare Clausum in
1635. 19 Although Grotius’ arguments were primarily aimed at expansive Spanish
and Portuguese claims, Selden noted that England’s claims to the waters
surrounding it would be defeated by Grotius’ ideas. Selden insisted that “the
sea . . . is not common to all men, but capable of private dominion or property as
well as the land.” 20 The King of Great Britain, he argued, “is lord of the sea flowing
about, as an inseparable and perpetual appendant of the British Empire.” 21 These
two positions form the poles of a debate that continues into the present day, often
providing the fuel for maritime disputes between states.
Customary international law adopted an intermediate rule that attempted to
satisfy the interests of both commerce and coastal states. 22 Until well into the
twentieth century, coastal states enjoyed territorial sovereignty up to three nautical
miles from their shores. Calculated roughly to match the maximum effective range

14
15
16
17
18
19

20
21
22

Id. at 45–46.
Id. at 45–46 & n. 10.
HUGO GROTIUS, MARE LIBERUM (2012).
Id. at 12–15 (“By the Law of Nations navigation is free to all persons whatsoever.”).
Id. at 64.
JOHN SELDEN, MARE CLAUSUM SEU DE DOMINO MARIS (Andrew Kembe & Edward Thomas trans.,
1663).
Id. at xii.
Id.
See Clive Schofield, Parting the Waves: Claims to Maritime Jurisdiction and the Division of Ocean Space, 1
PENN. ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 40, 41 (2012) (“For a long period, the demand for freedom of the seas
in the interests of ensuring global trade prevailed, with the broad consensus being that coastal State
rights should be restricted to a narrow coastal belt of territorial waters.”).
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of cannons, 23 the rule gave states a buffer with which to protect their beaches and
ports without unnecessarily impinging on the freedom of navigation in the open
ocean. 24
The pace of legal development and codification accelerated throughout the
twentieth century. Following the First World War, American President Woodrow
Wilson demanded “[a]bsolute freedom of navigation upon the seas” as the second
of his Fourteen Points (ranking just after “open covenants of peace” in his
priorities). 25 The 1930 Hague Conference on the Codification of International
Law made an abortive attempt at clarifying customary law, but it was not until the
U.N. took up the effort after the Second World War that the process yielded the
modern law governing the oceans. 26
Today, the legal principles of free navigation of the seas and respect for
coastal states’ prerogatives take shape in the principal international agreement on
maritime law, UNCLOS. 27 The First Convention (UNCLOS I) met in 1958 and
produced a number of generic documents but failed to delineate specific
provisions for a comprehensive agreement. 28 UNCLOS II convened two years
later and failed to reach agreement on the breadth of the territorial sea and limits
on fisheries, two items left unresolved at the first conference. 29
The 1973 Convention (UNCLOS III) finally produced a comprehensive
international agreement on maritime law. Completed in 1982, it departed from
customary law by establishing greater protections for coastal states. The
framework extended the territorial sea to twelve nautical miles—four times what

23

24

See id. at 41–42. But see generally Wyndham L. Walker, Territorial Waters: The Cannon Shot Rule, 22 BRIT.
Y.B. INT’L L. 210 (1945) (questioning whether the customary rule was originally associated with
cannon range and suggesting alternative theories).
See Schofield, supra note 22, at 42 (articulating the evolution of “creeping coastal state jurisdiction”).

25

Woodrow Wilson’s 14 Points (1918), OUR DOCUMENTS (Jan. 8, 1918), https://perma.cc/LUB9W47M.

26

See Schofield, supra note 22, at 42 (“While efforts were made towards the codification of the
international law of the sea . . . little progress had been achieved by the mid-Twentieth Century.
Substantial changes, however, were afoot with more and more States advancing expansive maritime
jurisdictional claims—a phenomenon generally termed ‘creeping coastal State jurisdiction.’”).

27

For a more detailed overview of the modern history of international maritime law and the various
U.N. Conventions, see id. at 42–48.

28

See id. UNCLOS I produced four separate documents: Convention on the Territorial Sea and
Contiguous Zone, Apr. 4, 1958, 516 U.N.T.S. 205; Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958,
450 U.N.T.S. 11; Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High
Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 559 U.N.T.S. 285; Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 499
U.N.T.S. 311.
Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Final Act, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.19/L.15
(1960).

29
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it had been for the previous several centuries. 30 It also established a twelve nautical
mile contiguous zone beyond the territorial sea, in which a coastal state may
“prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary laws and
regulations within its territory or territorial seas.” 31 Most notably, the Convention
established an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) that extends 200 nautical miles
from the shore (when space provides). 32 The EEZ grants coastal states “sovereign
rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving, and managing[]
natural resources, whether living or non-living.” 33 Such activities include “(i) the
establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures; (ii) marine
scientific research; [and] (iii) the protection and preservation of the marine
environment,” among others. 34 The establishment of EEZs drastically increased
the amount of ocean space that was subject to some level of sovereign control by
coastal states; by one estimate, EEZs now cover 43 million square nautical miles,
which amounts to 41 percent of the area of the world’s oceans or the approximate
equivalent of the total area of the world’s landmasses. 35
These are merely a few examples of the developments in maritime law that
UNCLOS brought about that provide context for the scope of the rights involved
when states are unable to resolve their differences in interpretation and application
of the Convention. Fortunately, the Convention also created a novel solution to
this challenge—a binding dispute resolution system.

III. B INDING D ISPUTE R ESOLUTION
During the negotiation of the Convention, several parties demanded the
inclusion of a binding dispute resolution system to prevent the use of force or
intimidation in questions over the interpretation and application of UNCLOS’s
terms. 36 Developed Western powers, including the U.S., were uncomfortable with
the departures from customary maritime law and believed that a number of
30

See UNCLOS, supra note 1, at art. 3.

31

Id. at art. 33.
See id. at art. 56.

32
33
34

Id.
Id.

35

See Schofield, supra note 22, at 46 (“Consequently, the drafting of [UNCLOS] and widespread
claiming of 200 [nautical mile] EEZs represents a profound reallocation of resource rights from
international to national jurisdiction. Realising the opportunities raised by these extended maritime
jurisdictional claims, notably protecting and managing marine resources and activities, is, however,
undoubtedly a challenging task. This task is made all the harder given the jurisdictional uncertainty
caused by undefined maritime boundaries and competing claims to maritime jurisdiction.”).

36

See generally Robin Churchill, “Compulsory” Dispute Settlement under the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea – How Has It Operated?, PLURICOURTS BLOG (Jun. 9, 2016), https://perma.cc/D29FYV89 (describing negotiations over the inclusion of Part XV).
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disputes would arise over them; a binding system to resolve those disputes was
critical to their acquiescence. Conversely, smaller, less powerful nations were
equally enthusiastic about the system, which they viewed as a tool they could
employ against their larger neighbors. The system’s inclusion was “viewed as
necessary to balance the interests of all states against the increased jurisdictional
competences given to coastal states by the Convention.” 37 At the time, such a
system was considered “innovative and far-reaching,” and observers had high
hopes for its future. 38

A. The System’s Design
The core function of the system is to dissuade parties from resorting to the
use of force to solve their problems and, instead, encourage resolution “by
peaceful means.” 39 Codified in Part XV of the Convention, the system establishes
a number of obligations for parties to fulfill prior to referring a dispute. These
include an exchange of views between the parties to clarify the extent of the
dispute and observation of any other compulsory mechanisms that exist in
separate agreements between them. 40 After fulfilling these obligations, states face
a unique and novel decision: which forum should hear the case?
UNCLOS offers four separate options to answer that question. 41 First, the
Convention established a new judicial body specifically to apply its law: the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). 42 ITLOS is empowered to
hear any dispute arising under the Convention, and it has special jurisdiction for
two claims: provisional measures under Article 290 and the prompt release of
detained vessels and their crews under Article 292. 43 Second, parties may refer
their disputes to the ICJ, 44 which may apply both UNCLOS and any other
authority that is available under the ICJ’s jurisdiction-granting statute. 45 Third, the
parties may opt for arbitration under Annex VII of the Convention. 46 Although
the parties enjoy the choice of a range of arbitral bodies, twelve of the thirteen
37
38

Rayfuse, supra note 7, at 683.
Id.

39

UNCLOS, supra note 1, at art. 279. Part XV explicitly supports the U.N. Charter’s goal of
encouraging the peaceful resolution of disputes. See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 3 & art. 33, ¶ 1.

40

See UNCLOS, supra note 1, at arts. 283–84.
See id. at art. 287(1).s

41
42
43
44
45
46

See id. at art. 287(1)(a).
See Section III(B)(1), infra.
See UNCLOS, supra note 1, at art. 287(1)(b).
Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993.
See UNCLOS, supra note 1, at art. 287(1)(c), Annex VII.
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arbitral cases raised so far have been heard under the auspices of the PCA. 47 Lastly,
parties may opt for special arbitration under Annex VIII. 48 These cases are
confined to a narrow field of highly technical disputes over “(1) fisheries, (2)
protection and preservation of the marine environment, (3) marine scientific
research, or (4) navigation, including pollution from vessels and by dumping.” 49
Article 287 calls for States Parties to select a preferred forum to hear their
disputes at the time of accession to the Convention. 50 In the event that a dispute
arises between parties that selected different preferred forums (or that have failed
to make a selection), the case defaults to Annex VII arbitration. 51 Even if both
parties have selected the same forum, they may agree to pursue the case
elsewhere. 52 States may change their forum selection at any time, although a new
selection does not affect ongoing proceedings. 53 Countries may choose more than
one forum and may rank them in order of preference as well. 54 At the time the
Convention was negotiated, “a choice of forum was said to be of critical
importance to acceptance of the proposed dispute settlement system.” 55
However, forum selections have not developed in the way that the framers
of the Convention envisioned. Although states are required to select a choice of
procedure under Article 287, only forty-three have done so (approximately 25
percent of all signatories). 56 Moreover, disputes often end up in forums other than
those that states have chosen because they agree to take the issue to another forum
or because the parties cannot agree and default to Annex VII arbitration. 57
47

See PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
https://perma.cc/M9NT-TME7.

48

See UNCLOS, supra note 1, at art. 287(1)(d), Annex VIII.
Id., at Annex VIII, art. 1.

49
50
51
52
53
54
55

See id. at art. 287(1).
See id. at art. 287(3), (5).
See id. at art. 287(4).
See id. at art. 287(7).
See id. at art. 287(1).
Churchill, supra note 36.

56

See UNITED NATIONS DIVISION FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, UNCLOS:
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES MECHANISM (2017), https://perma.cc/4YH7-6BVX (compiling all such
choices of procedure). Scholars have offered a number of potential explanations for the
“surprising” low number of declarations, including bureaucratic inertia and domestic distrust of
international courts (and preference for default arbitration). See, for example, Churchill, supra note 36
at para. 4.

57

See Rah & Wallrabenstein, supra note 7, at 44. In other cases, the parties sometimes elect to remove
the disputes from UNCLOS Part XV mechanisms altogether and find other solutions. “[E]ven
where all the parties to a dispute have accepted the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, they are not obliged
to submit the dispute to the Tribunal as per Article 280 UNCLOS. The parties still have the option
of settling the dispute by means other than the Tribunal.” Id.

296

Vol. 18 No. 1

International Law Adrift

Gates

B. A Summary of the Case Law
At the time of writing, forty-five cases have been submitted under Part XV
since UNCLOS came into effect in 1994, averaging just two per year. 58 Earlier
studies have catalogued those cases to some degree, but nearly ten years have
passed since those prior efforts. 59 In the meantime, several new cases have arisen
that have carried the development of the law into new territory, particularly with
respect to questions of jurisdiction. In order to evaluate existing theories of forum
selection, it is helpful to review trends in the case law to date. The Appendix
provides a table of the cases that may be useful to the reader. This Section
evaluates the cases by three categories: forum, subject matter, and participating
states.

1. States Parties have four options when selecting a forum under
Part XV.
Since the Convention established ITLOS in 1996, it has heard the lion’s
share of disputes with twenty-one cases. 60 ITLOS possesses a unique power to
issue advisory opinions interpreting the Convention, but it has exercised that
authority only twice. 61 ITLOS has three comparative advantages over its
counterparts in obtaining jurisdiction over Part XV cases. First, it has sole
jurisdiction under Article 290 to impose provisional measures on parties while
their cases are pending arbitration under Annex VII or Annex VIII. 62 Akin to
preliminary injunctions in courts of the U.S., these orders “have frequently helped
the parties to settle a dispute,” enabling ITLOS to facilitate the resolution of a

58

This Comment includes all disputes submitted for resolution, regardless of their outcome. Because
the Comment’s aim to is to discern trends in the initial selection of the forum rather than
development of substantive law, whether a tribunal eventually decides each case on its merits is
outside the scope of our attention.

59

See supra note 7.
See List of Cases, INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA, https://perma.cc/GX6VFYVV (last visited Mar. 17, 2017).
See Tuerk, supra note 7, at 292 (“The Convention does not contain any provision conferring advisory
jurisdiction on the Tribunal as such, which may, however, on the basis of Article 21 of its Statute
give an advisory opinion on a legal question if this is provided for by an international agreement
related to the purposes of the Convention conferring jurisdiction on it.”). For information on the
advisory opinions issued to date, see Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons
and Entities with respect to Activities in the Area, Case No. 17, Advisory Opinion, Feb. 1, 2011,
2011 ITLOS Rep. 10, 16–18, and Request for An Advisory Opinion Submitted by the Sub-Regional
Fisheries Commission (SRFC), Case No. 21, Advisory Opinion, April 2, 2015, 2015 ITLOS Rep.
___, 20–21, available at https://perma.cc/3ZB8-P4M9.

60

61

62

See UNCLOS, supra note 1, at art. 290(5).
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dispute even when the parties opt for arbitration. 63 Second, it has sole jurisdiction
to hear controversies involving the prompt release of detained vessels and crews
under Article 292. 64 In its first decade of operation, ITLOS heard cases about
detainment more than disputes over any other subject (nine in total), although it
has fielded only one such case since 2007. 65 Third, unlike arbitral tribunals, ITLOS
proceedings are free to signatories to the Convention, 66 and so are attractive to
countries that may otherwise not be able to afford arbitration.
As the second option for parties, the ICJ has heard ten cases under
UNCLOS since 1994. 67 Because it exists apart from the Convention and has its
own authorizing statute, the ICJ has a comparative advantage over ITLOS in that
it can apply other substantive sources of international law besides UNCLOS. 68
For example, in 2012, when the ICJ resolved a dispute over the delimitation of
the continental shelf between Colombia and Nicaragua, it applied Article 76 as
customary international law even though Colombia is not a signatory of
UNCLOS. 69

63

Churchill, supra note 36. In total, ITLOS has fielded seven cases involving a request for provisional
measures. Of the six that were decided (one remains pending before the Tribunal), only Arctic Sunrise
was fully arbitrated. See Section IV(A)(2), infra.

64

See UNCLOS, supra note 1, at art. 292(1).
For commentary on why no further cases had arisen by that time, see Churchill, supra note 36 (“The
reason why there have been no applications for almost ten years may be because detaining and flag
States have found helpful and acted in accordance with the criteria to be applied in setting a bond
that the ITLOS has elaborated in its case law. However, those criteria have been criticised in the
academic literature for not showing how the size of bonds actually set by the ITLOS were derived
therefrom, with the ITLOS being accused of simply plucking a figure from thin air.”). Cf. M/V
Norstar (Panama v. Italy), Case No. 25, Order 2016/1, Feb. 3, 2016, 2016 ITLOS Rep. ___ (being
the first case to arise under art. 292 in a decade).
See Proceedings Before the Tribunal, INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA, at sec. (i),
https://perma.cc/7UYV-AGQB (last visited Mar. 17, 2017). Cf. Schedule of Fees and Costs,
PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, https://perma.cc/3EYM-ZHHE (last visited Mar. 17,
2017).
See Contentious Cases, INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, https://perma.cc/RWY6-STBT (last
visited Mar. 17, 2017).
See Rah & Wallrabenstein, supra note 7, at 44–45 (“The ICJ has unlimited competence with respect
to disputes between States, provided that the States have accepted its jurisdiction.”).
See Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicar. v. Colom.), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. Rep. 624, ¶ 42 (Nov.
19) (“The Court notes that Colombia is not a State party to UNCLOS and that, therefore, the law
applicable in the case is customary international law. The Court considers that the definition of the
continental shelf set out in Article 76, paragraph 1, of UNCLOS forms part of customary
international law.”); see also Schofield, supra note 22, at 49 (describing ICJ’s application of UNCLOS
art. 15 as customary international law).
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The third available forum, Annex VII arbitration, has been dominated by
the PCA at The Hague; it has heard twelve of the thirteen such cases. 70 As the
default forum under Article 287, most cases arrive at the PCA because the parties
cannot agree to bring the case elsewhere. 71 Observers have suggested a few other
theories about why states might opt for arbitration rather than an international
judicial body, including domestic opposition to supranational courts and affinity
for arbitral procedures that are closer to common law states’ own judicial
procedures. 72
The final option, Annex VIII, which creates special arbitration for scientific
and technical matters, has never been used. 73 As a result, this Comment offers no
analysis on the subject.

2. Subject matter is often the determining factor in forum selection.
An analysis of the cases by subject matter presents a useful opportunity to
compare the frequency with which different forums hear similar types of cases.
Some trends comport with the text of the Convention. For instance, ITLOS hears
every law enforcement “prompt release” case under Article 292 because the
Convention grants ITLOS sole jurisdiction over those matters. 74 Parties with cases
tangentially dealing with the detention or confiscation of ships but not covered
under Article 292 also tend to choose ITLOS as a forum because of its subject
matter expertise in the field, even though those cases may not fall within ITLOS’s
exclusive jurisdiction. These include cases in which vessels have already been
released and parties seek damages for alleged violations of the Convention. 75
However, in other matters, such as boundary delimitation, there appears to be
70

See Section III(A), supra. The thirteenth case, The Southern Bluefin Tuna Case, was referred to the
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and subsequently
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Because nearly every other Annex VII case has been adjudicated
by the PCA, this Comment will focus solely on the PCA’s role as the primary forum for arbitration.
See generally Southern Bluefin Tuna Case (Austl. & N.Z. v. Japan), Award on Jurisdiction and
Admissibility of Aug. 4, 2000, Arbitral Tribunal constituted under Annex VII of the United Nations
Convention for the Law of the Sea.

71

See UNCLOS, supra note 1, at art. 287, para. 1.
See Section III(C), infra.

72
73

74
75

See Rah & Wallrabenstein, supra note 7, at n.6 and accompanying text (“There have been no
instances of disputes being referred to arbitration in accordance with Annex VIII so far. Given that
only eight parties to the Convention have selected Annex VIII arbitration as one of their preferred
procedures for the time being, the chances of a dispute being referred to Annex VIII arbitration
are currently rather small.”); see also Churchill, supra note 36 (“This is probably because of the small
numbers of States selecting these fora as their preferred means of settlement and the fact that the
inclusion of Annex VIII arbitration in UNCLOS was a concession to the then Soviet bloc.”).
See UNCLOS, supra note 1, at art. 292(1).
See, for example, M/V Norstar, supra note 65.
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some competition between the forums for business. 76 Additionally, as noted
above, states often make use of the provisional measures option under Article 290
to invoke the jurisdiction of both ITLOS and the PCA in the hopes that one or
both will render a favorable ruling. 77
a) Law enforcement
Eighteen cases have arisen under Part XV regarding enforcement of either
international or domestic laws against foreign-flagged vessels operating in EEZs.
These are more numerous than disputes on any other subject. Because of its sole
jurisdiction to hear “prompt release” cases under Article 292, ITLOS has heard
fifteen of the disputes (nearly 85 percent). As the only tribunal developing the law
in this area, ITLOS has had free reign to establish rules to govern the release of
vessels that are detained for alleged violations, allowing flag states to post a
security bond in return for their ships and crew members while pledging to return
the suspects when the time for trial arrives. 78
In the first case it heard, M/V Saiga, ITLOS established a legal framework
for evaluating the issues at the center of most disputes—the calculation of the
proper amount for the security bond. 79 After ITLOS affirmed the rule in its
second “prompt release” case, Camouco, the cases immediately began to dwindle. 80
ITLOS decided its last “prompt release” case in 2007, though another is pending
resolution. 81

76

Compare Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between Ghana and Côte
d’Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana v. Côte d’Ivoire), Case No. 23, Order 2016/7, Dec. 15, 2016,
2016 ITLOS Rep. 122 (selecting ITLOS) with The Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Arbitration
(Bangl. v. India), Perm. Ct. Arb. Case No. 2010-16, Award of Jul. 7, 2014 (selecting the PCA).

77

See Section III(B)(1), supra. Issuance of provisional measures by ITLOS often drives the parties to
settlement before their case is arbitrated on the merits. See, for example, Case Concerning Land
Reclamation by Singapore in and Around the Straits of Johor (Malay. v. Sing.), Case No. 12, Order
of Oct. 8, 2003, 2003 ITLOS Rep. 10 (ITLOS); Land Reclamation by Singapore in and Around the
Straits of Johor (Malay. v. Sing.), Perm. Ct. Arb. Case No. 2004-05, Award on Agreed Terms, Sep.
1, 2005.

78

See John E. Noyes, Law of the Sea Dispute Settlement: Past, Present, and Future, 5 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 301, 302 (1999).

79

See The “M/V Saiga” Case (St. Vincent v. Guinea), Case No. 1, Judgment, Dec. 4, 1997, 1997
ITLOS Rep. 16 ¶ 82 (“In the view of the Tribunal, the criterion of reasonableness encompasses the
amount, the nature and the form of the bond or financial security. The overall balance of the
amount, form and nature of the bond or financial security must be reasonable.”).

80

See “The Camouco” Case (Pan. v. Fr.), Case No. 5, Judgment, Feb. 7, 2000, 2000 ITLOS Rep. 10
¶¶ 66–67 (noting that relevant factors include “the gravity of the alleged offences, the penalties
imposed or imposable under the laws of the detaining State, the value of the detained vessel and of
the cargo seized, the amount of the bond imposed by the detaining State and its form.”).

81

See M/V Norstar, supra note 65.
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More recently, ITLOS has served as the preliminary court to impose
provisional measures before referring law enforcement matters to the PCA under
Annex VII. 82 These cases include ARA Libertad, in which Ghana detained an
Argentinian warship, 83 and Arctic Sunrise, in which Russia arrested Greenpeace
members protesting an oil platform and impounded their vessel. 84 In both
instances, ITLOS imposed provisional measures for release of the vessels and
crew before referring the cases to the PCA to consider violations of the law and
corresponding damages.
In contrast to the high volume of law enforcement cases that ITLOS has
adjudicated, the PCA has heard only three. Two of those were ARA Libertad and
Arctic Sunrise, in which ITLOS first imposed provisional measures; ARA Libertad
settled before the PCA could rule, 85 while Arctic Sunrise saw one party refuse to
participate, allowing the PCA to reach a final judgment on the merits that largely
followed ITLOS’s preliminary opinion. 86 The third case, Duzgit Integrity, remains
pending. 87
b) Boundary delimitation
In contrast with ITLOS’s dominance in law enforcement matters, the ICJ
has done the bulk of the work on maritime boundary delimitation. It has heard
eight of the twelve cases brought under Part XV, with many involving land
boundaries as well as maritime borders. 88 For this reason, the ICJ seems to be the
best situated venue to delimit boundaries; its ability to decide issues outside the
maritime context allows states to settle their disputes with their neighbors in a
82

See Noyes, supra note 78, at 302.

83

See The “ARA Libertad” Case (Arg. v. Ghana), Case No. 20, Order, Dec. 15, 2012, 2012 ITLOS
Rep. 332.

84

See The “Arctic Sunrise” Case (Neth. v. Rus.), Case No. 22, Order, Nov. 22, 2013, 2013 ITLOS
Rep. 230; see also Section IV(A)(2), infra.

85

See The ARA Libertad Arbitration, Perm. Ct. Arb. Case No. 2013-11, Termination Order, Nov. 11,
2013.

86

See The Arctic Sunrise Arbitration (Neth. v. Rus.), Perm. Ct. Arb. Case No. 2014-02, Award, Aug.
14, 2015; see also Section IV(A)(2), infra.

87

See Duzgit Integrity (Malta v. São Tomé and Príncipe), Perm. Ct. Arb. Case No. 2014-07, Award,
Sep. 5, 2016.

88

See, for example, Maritime Delimitation in the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean (Costa Rica v.
Nicar.) and Land Boundary in the Northern Part of Isla Portillos, Order, 2017 I.C.J. Nos. 157 &
165, ¶¶ 16-17 (Feb. 2, 2017), available at https://perma.cc/4RPP-KJ2Q (joining the two cases
under Art. 47 of the Rules of the Court in order “to address simultaneously the totality of the
various interrelated and contested issues raised by the Parties, including any questions of fact or law
that are common to the disputes presented”). ITLOS has no such ability to consider issues that do
not arise under UNCLOS. The ICJ’s application of other sources of law to maritime disputes dates
back to its founding after the Second World War. See The Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), Judgment,
1951 I.C.J. Rep. 116 (Dec. 18, 1951).
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single sitting rather than separating the land and sea cases in separate forums. Clive
Schofield, Director of the Australian Centre for Ocean Resources and Security at
the University of Wollongong, posited that the ICJ’s work in boundary
delimitation predates UNCLOS, providing a rich body of precedent on which to
draw that the other forums lack. 89 The ICJ has made use of its dominant position
in the international legal environment on multiple occasions to declare sections of
UNCLOS to be customary international law and therefore binding on
signatories. 90
In recent years, the other forums have also participated successfully in
boundary delimitation cases. The PCA delimited maritime borders between
Barbados and Trinidad & Tobago in 2006, 91 Guyana and Suriname in 2007, 92 and
Bangladesh and India in 2014. 93 ITLOS resolved a border dispute between
Bangladesh and Myanmar in 2012. 94
c) Fisheries and environmental protection
The remaining cases do not fall neatly into any one category, and have
accordingly been distributed fairly evenly among the tribunals. ITLOS is the only
forum that has successfully issued any kind of order in a case involving fisheries.
There have been five cases to date, and all five eventually settled before a judgment
on the merits (three for ITLOS, one for the PCA, and one for the ICJ). In the
Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, ITLOS imposed provisional measures on Japan when
it allegedly exceeded its fishing quotas by creating a scientific experiments program
that necessitated catching extra tuna. 95 However, the parties settled the matter in
advance of Annex VII arbitration. 96 Four cases (covering two disputes) have
focused primarily on environmental protection. In The MOX Plant, Ireland
successfully petitioned ITLOS to impose provisional measures on the
89
90
91
92
93
94

See Schofield, supra note 22, at 48–54.
See Nicar. v. Colom., supra note 69.
See Barb. v. Trin. & Tobago, Perm. Ct. Arb. Case No. 2004-02, Award, Apr. 11, 2006.
See Guy. v. Suriname, Perm. Ct. Arb. Case No. 2004-04, Award, Sep. 17, 2007.
See Bang. v. India, supra note 76.
See Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between Bangladesh and Myanmar
in the Bay of Bengal (Bang. v. Myan.), Case No. 16, Judgment, Mar. 14, 2012, 2012 ITLOS Rep. 4.
Bangladesh is the only state that has opted to bring similar disputes to different forums under
UNCLOS (the PCA and ITLOS). See Bang. v. India, supra note 76. The decision cannot be explained
by Article 287 choice of procedure selections; Bangladesh has opted for ITLOS for specific matters,
while both India and Myanmar failed to submit selections and therefore default to Annex VII
arbitration.

95

See The Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (N.Z. v. Japan; Austl. v. Japan), Cases No. 3-4, Order, Aug.
27, 1999, available at https://perma.cc/H92X-ML5E.

96

See The Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, supra note 70.
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construction of a new nuclear power plant in the U.K. 97 The case was later
dropped before a PCA ruling because of changes in E.U. law that left the issue
moot. 98 A similar process occurred in Malaysia v. Singapore: ITLOS imposed
provisional measures on land reclamation projects in the Straits of Johor, but the
parties settled the matter prior to an arbitral award. 99
The final two cases do not fit neatly into any single category. In Chagos Marine
Protected Area, Mauritius argued that it, and not the U.K., should be considered the
coastal state for all rights arising under UNCLOS with respect to the Chagos
Archipelago, home to the British and American military base at Diego Garcia in
the Indian Ocean. 100 The dispute arose from Britain’s lease on the islands for
military purposes; Mauritius suggested that it should govern the fisheries and other
maritime resources in the islands’ EEZ, which Britain argued would interfere with
its lease. 101 The PCA punted the issue, finding that UNCLOS could not answer
questions of sovereignty but agreeing with Mauritius that Britain had a duty to
preserve the natural resources for the eventual return of control to Mauritius. 102
The second case, The South China Sea Arbitration, is a uniquely famous case that is
discussed at length in Section IV(B). 103
Early in the age of Part XV, Sicco Rah and Tilo Wallrabenstein of the Law
of the Sea and Maritime Law Institute at the University of Hamburg suggested
that ITLOS would take on a special role in the field of environmental protection
through its unique authority to issue advisory opinions that would guide the
development of the law. 104 The cases, however, do not support that theory.
ITLOS has participated in cases involving the environment only as the forum for
provisional measures, while the parties selected arbitration to issue rulings on the
merits. Likewise, ITLOS has issued only two advisory opinions; only one had any
connection to environmental protection. 105 Finally, there has been some modern
criticism of ITLOS’s decisions in “prompt release” cases. Some observers believe
that ITLOS tends to impose undervalued security bonds for violating vessels to

97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105

See The MOX Plant Case (Ir. v. U.K.), Case No. 10, Order, Dec. 3, 2001, 2001 ITLOS Rep. 95.
See The MOX Plant Case (Ir. v. U.K.), Perm. Ct. Arb. Case No. 2002-01, Order No. 6, Jun. 6, 2008.
See Malay. v. Sing., supra note 77.
See Chagos Marine Protected Area (Mauritius v. U.K.), Case No. 2011-03, Award of Mar. 18, 2015.
See id. at ¶¶ 5–13.
See id. at ¶ 547.
Supra note 5.
See Rah & Wallrabenstein, supra note 7, at 57–65.
See Responsibilities and Obligations, supra note 61.
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obtain their release from detention, in effect lowering the deterrent for crimes like
poaching protected fish. 106

3. Certain petitioning states exhibit preferences for particular forums,
but Article 287 has little impact on forum selection.
This Section will provide a brief comment on the interaction between Article
287 choice of procedure selections and the actual behavior of parties when
selecting a forum. 107 Of the twenty-eight states that have brought cases under Part
XV in any forum, only eleven had previously selected a preferred forum. Of those
eleven, six ended up in a forum other than the one they preferred. Five states
followed the default pattern of using Annex VII arbitration in the event that the
two parties could not agree: Argentina and Ghana, Bangladesh and India,
Denmark and the E.U., Italy and India, and The Netherlands and Russia. In one
case, because the defendant had not signed onto UNCLOS, the case defaulted to
the ICJ as the only forum that had jurisdiction over both parties (Chile and
Peru). 108
There are two other interesting items to note. First, as might be expected,
those countries that specialize in acting as flag states for commercial vessels, such
as Panama and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, frequently appear before
ITLOS in the context of petitioning for prompt release of their vessels or damages
after the fact. 109 Similarly, Nicaragua has become a frequent petitioner at the ICJ.
It brought four of the ten cases the ICJ has heard under UNCLOS (Honduras
and multiple disputes with Colombia) and appeared as the respondent in a fifth
case in which Costa Rica is the petitioner. 110

C. Theories on Forum Shopping
Scholars have posited a number of theories to explain how states go about
shopping for a forum under Part XV. However, no study within the last decade
has updated those theories in light of new cases to test their accuracy. This
Comment will attempt to do so. While some theories, such as that selection is
based on the subject matter at issue, have strong support. Others are less helpful
in predicting where a case will be filed. 111
106

See, for example, Adrienne J. Oppenheim, Note, The Plight of the Patagonian Toothfish: Lessons from the
Volga Case, 30 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 293, 314–15 (2004).

107

See Section III(A), supra.
See Section III(C), infra.

108
109

See Appendix, infra. Panama filed four of the 23 ITLOS cases; Saint Vincent filed three. For
information on the roles and duties of flag states, see UNCLOS, supra note 1, at art. 90–94.

110

See Appendix, infra.
See Section III(B)(2), supra. This section excludes cases arising under Articles 290 and 292, which
establish compulsory jurisdiction in ITLOS.

111
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1. Scholars offer a number of useful theories that remain relevant
and informative.
First, the framers of the Convention assumed that states would select forums
using the choice of procedure under Article 287, which would decide the issue of
forum shopping at the time of accession and provide a stable framework for
determining the proper venue ex ante. As noted above, this concept was not
realized. However, ITLOS Judge Tullio Treves has suggested that the fact that
few states parties have submitted Article 287 selections does not necessarily
represent widespread disapproval of the dispute resolution system or ITLOS in
general. 112 He points out that, of those states that have made the selection, the
vast majority opted against arbitration. 113 Given his position, he takes that fact as
a heartening sign for the acceptance of international courts over arbitration. 114
However, as described earlier, Article 287 selections have determined the forum
in just five cases over twenty years. 115
Second, some scholars have suggested that procedural differences can
explain affinities for arbitration over other venues. Rah and Wallrabenstein note
that arbitration seems to have been the preferred procedure in cases that are
eligible to go elsewhere (contingent on the agreement of both parties), even
though the cost of resolving the dispute at ITLOS is usually lower than the cost
of arbitrating it. 116 They explain the puzzle by noting the advantages of arbitration.
First, arbitration is more acceptable to domestic public opinion, especially for the
losing country. 117 Adverse rulings by international legal tribunals sometimes
provoke a public backlash against participation in agreements that the public
perceives as a cession of sovereignty to a supranational body; arbitration tends to
avoid such optics. 118 They also note the increased confidentiality available in
arbitration and the bar to third party intervention that does not exist at ITLOS or

112

See Tullio Treves, Conflicts Between the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and the International
Court of Justice, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L & POL. 809, 819–20 (1999).

113

See id.
See id.

114
115
116

117
118

See Section III(B)(3), supra.
See Rah & Wallrabenstein, supra note 7, at 53; see also Tuerk, supra note 7, at 295 (noting the difference
in cost between the forums).
See Rah & Wallrabenstein, supra note 7, at 53.
See id. On the subject of public backlash, see, for example, “Heraldo Muñoz se abre a debatir retiro
de Chile de Pacto de Bogotá: ‘Es una discusión legítima,’” LA SEGUNDA (Jan. 28, 2014),
https://perma.cc/2UG3-XAVM. After losing a (non-UNCLOS) dispute with Peru at the ICJ in
2014 and facing a similar claim by Bolivia, Chile’s Foreign Minister publicly weighed the option of
pulling out of the Pact of Bogotá to avoid ICJ jurisdiction.
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the ICJ. 119 In the ten years since Rah and Wallrabenstein published their
comments, arbitration has continued to draw the majority of petitions that are
eligible to be heard outside ITLOS and that do not involve boundary delimitation.
Finally, Professors Emilia Powell and Sara Mitchell recently introduced
interesting quantitative research suggesting that there is a correlation between the
type of domestic legal system a state employs and its forum under Part XV. 120
They argue that common law countries have a strong aversion to the ICJ and
prefer arbitration because it mimics the common law system in several respects. 121
Conversely, civil law countries are more likely to opt for the ICJ and ITLOS
because “the similarities between legal rules of the ICJ [and ITLOS] and the civil
law tradition enhance civil law states’ comfort levels in working with the World
Court.” 122 The thesis is novel and deserves further analysis, but that effort is
outside the scope of this Comment.

2. Other conclusions arise from the cases.
While instances of forum selection may not have played out exactly as the
framers of UNCLOS might have imagined, Part XV has grown into a robust
dispute resolution system with important contributions to the development of
international maritime law. The system seems to have developed a comprehensive
normative framework for the resolution of certain types of disputes by
establishing clear rules that reduce transaction costs and facilitate bargaining
among parties ex ante rather than invoking Part XV. 123 UNCLOS has made
particular strides of this sort in the areas of prompt release cases, evidenced by
successful resolution of a number of early cases, the development and application
of a set of clear and consistent rules, and a subsequent decline in frequency of
similar disputes. 124
However, the most important development since the last round of studies a
decade ago has been the emergence of a counter-movement by the great powers
of the world. This phenomenon adds a layer of complexity to forum shopping for
119

See Rah & Wallrabenstein, supra note 7, at 53–54.

120

See Emilia Justyna Powell & Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, Forum Shopping for the Best Adjudicator:
Conflict Management and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (unpublished
manuscript) (on file at https://perma.cc/25DP-S3AJ) (last visited Apr. 8, 2017).
See id. at 5.

121
122
123

124

Id.
For a discussion of the role of norms in regulating behavior in international law, see Sungjoon Cho,
The Nature of Remedies in International Trade Law, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 763, 790–99 (“In this sense,
norm-sustaining or norm-building itself through the [WTO] dispute settlement mechanism is a
collective, communal remedy. . . because it serves the broader goal of governing the global trading
community beyond merely resolving disputes between the parties concerned.”).
See Appendix, infra.
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any country considering bringing a claim against a powerful neighbor: even if a
complainant selects the most advantageous forum for its grievance, will its
opponent agree to participate in resolving the issue? More importantly, even if the
complainant wins on the merits, will the state subject to the judgment change its
behavior? 125 The current trend suggests that the answer to both questions is no,
which poses a problem for the survival of the binding dispute resolution system.

IV. R EFUSAL TO P ARTIC IPATE AND THE F UTURE OF
THE S YSTEM
In the more than two decades since UNCLOS entered into effect, its system
of resolving disputes between States Parties has achieved great success in
regulating a number of fields of maritime law. Nine disputed maritime borders
have been finalized and seven vessels and their crews have been released on bond
after detention in a foreign country. More important than the resolution of each
individual dispute, the various forums have begun to establish rules that govern
each type of situation, allowing parties to avoid dispute resolution by bargaining
in light of established guidelines. 126 However, the past few years have seen States
Parties that once abided by the rules and norms of UNCLOS begin to refuse to
participate in the dispute resolution process. Because the refusing parties are also
the world’s preeminent political and military powers, non-participation raises
serious concerns about the efficacy of the system and its future.

A. The Russian Federation
The Russian Federation, then the Soviet Union, was one of the initial
signatories to the Convention in 1982. 127 It ratified UNCLOS in 1997, three years
after the treaty went into effect. 128 Both at signing and again at ratification, Russia
appended declarations refusing to submit to binding dispute resolution
procedures in a number of situations, including “disputes concerning . . . sea
125

Ensuring that states comply with norms and judgments has traditionally been one of the most
difficult challenges in establishing effective frameworks of international law. See John Norton
Moore, Enhancing Compliance with International Law: A Neglected Remedy, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 881, 884
(1999) (“Surely, the greatest weakness of the contemporary international system is not the absence
of authoritative norms, or underlying intellectual understanding about the need for such norms, but
rather the all-too-frequent absence of compliance.”) (emphasis in original). This Comment
identifies particular instances of the problem in the context of UNCLOS Part XV dispute
resolution. See Section IV, infra.

126

See, for example, Michael White & Stephen Knight, ITLOS and the ‘Volga’ Case: The Russian Federation
v. Australia, 17 MAR. L. ASS’N OF AUSTL. & N.Z. J. 40, 51–53 (2003) (examining emerging rules for
setting reasonable bonds for the release of detained foreign vessels).
See Chronological Lists, supra note 9.

127
128

See id.
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boundary delimitations . . . [or] law-enforcement activities in regard to the exercise
of sovereign rights or jurisdiction.” 129 It is one of only forty-eight countries that
have been involved in the resolution of a dispute, appearing before ITLOS three
times: the first as a plaintiff and two other times as the defendant. 130
In some sense, Russia’s involvement with the system represents a model of
how the process should work: each case struck a balance between the needs of
both States Parties while attempting to maintain a consistent legal framework.
However, Russia was also called to appear before the PCA in an Annex XII case
in 2013, after it adopted an unusual position that marked a turning point in the
development of the dispute resolution system.

1. Russia largely abided by its commitments in earlier cases.
This Section examines Russia’s initial interactions with binding dispute
resolution under UNCLOS. In its first three Part XV cases through 2007, the
Russian Federation largely abided by its duties under Part XV and had a mixed
record of success before ITLOS.
a) The “Volga” case 131
In February 2002, Australian military personnel aboard HMAS Canberra
boarded the Volga, which was a Russian fishing vessel allegedly fleeing Australia’s
EEZ. 132 After Australian authorities detained the ship in Fremantle for violations
of domestic fishing laws, they charged three Spanish crewmembers with criminal
offenses and released them on bail. 133 The Russian government filed an
application with the ITLOS under Article 292 to obtain the prompt release of the
vessel and her crew in return for a security bond. 134
The case was the fourth time ITLOS heard a dispute under Article 292, and
it adhered closely to the legal standards it had previously established to determine
the reasonableness of a security bond. 135 In a victory for Australia, and for the
dispute resolution procedures, ITLOS determined that Australia had requested a
reasonable bond and ordered Russia to make the payment in order to obtain the

129
130

Russian Federation, Declarations and Reservations, UNCLOS, Mar. 12, 1997, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
See Appendix.

131

For a detailed treatment of the facts of the case and the resulting legal implications, see generally
Oppenheim, supra note 106.

132

The “Volga” Case (Rus. v. Austr.), Case No. 11, Judgment, December 23, 2002, 2002 ITLOS Rep.
10, 20–29.

133

Id.
Id.

134
135

Id. at 31 (citing Camouco, supra note 80, at 67).
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release of the vessel. 136 The case was particularly noteworthy among international
legal proceedings for its quick three-week completion.
b) The “Hoshinmaru” Case (Japan v. Russian Federation)
The first of two companion cases before ITLOS in 2007, Hoshinmaru,
stemmed from the Russian detention of a Japanese fishing vessel following a
routine inspection in the Russian EEZ. 137 Although the vessel was licensed to fish
in the area, the inspection uncovered a cache of sockeye salmon that the fishermen
were attempting to pass off as chum in violation of Russian regulations. 138 The
Russian Coast Guard detained the vessel in Petropavlovsk and Japan filed an
application with ITLOS under Article 292 for its prompt return. 139 Before ITLOS
considered the application, Russia set a bond of approximately $980,000 USD,
representing both the value of the boat and estimated damages to the salmon
population. Japan alleged that the amount was unreasonable and requested
ITLOS’s assistance in resolving the issue. 140
The situation differed from Volga in one key respect. In that case, Australia
set the amount for the security bond soon after the detention of the vessel in
accordance with Article 73 of the Convention. ITLOS stepped in at Russia’s
request, but it found the bond to be reasonable and merely facilitated the
transaction. In Hoshinmaru, however, Russia waited weeks to respond to Japanese
requests for a bond; it only named a figure once Japan invoked ITLOS’s aid. 141 In
its judgment on the merits, ITLOS struck down the $980,000 as excessive and
reduced the amount to approximately $445,000. 142
c) The “Tomimaru” Case (Japan v. Russian Federation)
The second of the two cases of 2007 turned out better for Russia. As in
Hoshinmaru, the problem involved the detention of a Japanese vessel for illegal
fishing in the Russian EEZ. However, because the particular offenses were much
more egregious by the standards of Russian domestic law (tons of illegal fish
caught and fraudulently concealed in the ship’s logs), local law enforcement
officials obtained a court order to confiscate the vessel as evidence in their
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prosecution in the matter. 143 The decision was litigated as far as Russia’s Supreme
Court, which upheld the confiscation. 144 Japan requested ITLOS’s assistance, but
ITLOS refused to intervene. 145 It found that Russia had properly resolved the
matter in its own courts, and that any involvement on its part would “contradict
the [domestic] decision . . . and encroach upon national competences, thus
contravening Article 292.” 146

2. Russia adopted a new approach in Arctic Sunrise (The Netherlands
v. Russian Federation).
With three previous appearances before ITLOS, Russia had become one of
the most frequent participants in Part XV proceedings by 2007. However,
concurrent with other changes in its foreign policy, Russia took a new approach
the next time representatives of ITLOS came calling. In September 2013, the
Arctic Sunrise, a Dutch vessel chartered by Greenpeace, staged a protest of the
Russian oil platform Prirazlomnaya in the Russian EEZ in the Pechora Sea. 147 The
Russian Coast Guard seized the ship, towed it to Murmansk, and arrested the
crew. In response, the Netherlands, as flag state of the vessel, sought a prompt
release under Article 292. When Russia disregarded the request, the Netherlands
filed an application for provisional measures under Article 290 with ITLOS, to
include the release of the vessel and its crew. 148 It also filed a subsequent
application for Annex VII arbitration to determine both the legality of Russia’s
actions and monetary damages with the PCA. 149
Unlike in previous instances, Russia balked. In a note verbale addressed to
ITLOS, Russia recalled the declaration it made in 1997: “[Russia] does not accept
procedures provided for in Section 2 of Part XV of the Convention, entailing
binding decisions with respect to disputes . . . concerning law-enforcement
activities in regard to the exercise of sovereign rights or jurisdiction.” 150 It notified
ITLOS that it did not accept ITLOS’s jurisdiction to hear the case and would not
participate in the proceedings. 151 ITLOS thus faced a difficult question: what to
do when a State Party does not appear in court?
143
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The Netherlands responded with a novel legal argument. It suggested that
declarations such as the one that Russia made can deny jurisdiction only over
those matters of which the Convention allows a coastal state to opt out. 152 The
declaration arose under Article 298, which allows states to opt out of jurisdiction
for “disputes concerning law enforcement activities in regard to the exercise of
sovereign rights or jurisdiction excluded from the jurisdiction of a court or
tribunal under Article 297, paragraph 2 or 3.” 153 Article 297, paragraph 2 provides
that “a coastal state shall not be obliged to accept the submission of [a dispute
regarding marine scientific research]” arising out of other sections governing the
conduct of such research within a state’s EEZ. 154 Paragraph 3 provides the same
right to coastal states in disputes over fisheries within their EEZs. 155 Because this
dispute had nothing to do with research or fishing, the Netherlands argued,
Russia’s declaration ran into a barrier erected by Article 309: 156 “No reservations
or exceptions may be made to this Convention unless expressly permitted by other
articles of this Convention.” 157 Article 310 clarifies that rule:
Article 309 does not preclude a State . . . from making declarations . . . with a
view . . . to the harmonization of its laws and regulations with the provisions
of this Convention, provided that such declarations or statements do not
purport to exclude or to modify the legal effect of the provisions of this
Convention in their application to that State. 158

Because Russia’s declaration under Article 298 did not accord with Article
297, the Netherlands argued, it could not be the case that it shielded Russia from
the binding resolution of disputes without violating Articles 309 and 310. 159
ITLOS agreed and notified Russia that it did, in fact, have jurisdiction. 160
Russia remained obstinate, however. Relying on several ICJ precedents,
ITLOS held that “the absence of a party . . . does not constitute a bar to the
proceedings.” 161 Although ITLOS attempted to take into account Russia’s interest
152
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judgment in accordance with Article 59 of the Statute.”).
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as best it could, it ruled for the Netherlands and ordered the immediate release of
the vessel and non-Russian members of its crew in returning for a €3.6 million
security bond, pending arbitration. 162 Russia refused to comply with the order,
although it granted the crew amnesty within a month, released them, and finally
released the ship several months later. 163
The Netherlands took the case to the PCA the following year to secure a
declaration that Russia’s conduct had been a violation of international law, as well
as an apology and monetary damages. 164 Again, despite ITLOS’s finding of
jurisdiction, Russia refused to participate. 165 The PCA produced a detailed ruling
on the merits of the case, finding unanimously that Russia had violated the
Convention and ordering it to return all property confiscated aboard Arctic
Sunrise. 166 It also ordered damages for harm done to the vessel, although the
calculation of damages remains ongoing at the time of writing. 167
Taken alone, the Arctic Sunrise cases under Part XV might have been an
anomaly among a string of otherwise successful dispute resolutions by the various
available forums. The underlying incident was a relatively minor occurrence in
comparison with other disputes between the Russian Federation and the West in
2013. 168 The case became a turning point in great power approaches to binding
dispute resolution, however, when the People’s Republic of China adopted
Russia’s theory of Part XV jurisdiction in a high profile case at the center of a
major controversy in East Asia. 169

B. The People’s Republic of China
The People’s Republic of China was also an original signatory to the
Convention in 1982, ratifying the agreement in 1996. 170 At the time of ratification,
China added a number of qualifications to its participation in the Convention. 171
They included an affirmation of “sovereign rights and jurisdiction” over its EEZ,
162
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a commitment to resolve border disputes through bilateral negotiations, and a
reaffirmation of sovereignty over a number of outlying islands. 172 In 2006, China
added a remedial declaration under Article 298 to limit its participation in the
dispute resolution scheme: “[China] does not accept any of the procedures
provided for in Section 2 of Part XV of the Convention with respect to all the
categories of disputes referred to in paragraph 1 (a) (b) and (c) of Article 298 of
the Convention.” 173 This reservation, nearly identical to Russia’s, 174 would play an
important role in a future dispute.

1. China followed Russia’s lead in The South China Sea Arbitration
(The Republic of the Philippines v. The People’s Republic of
China).
China avoided dispute resolution under UNCLOS for nearly two decades.
However, in the same year that Russia refused to participate in Arctic Sunrise, China
adopted Russia’s approach and successfully undercut the dispute resolution
system. The Philippines brought a case for arbitration to the PCA against China
in early 2013. 175 The dispute was the most ambitious challenge for Part XV to
date, and so it was closely watched by powers around the world and had the
potential to reset power dynamics in East Asia at just the point when China was
becoming more assertive militarily. 176 The Philippines’s move thus represented a
critical opportunity for the international legal system to resolve a simmering
dispute that experts identified as the “cauldron” in which tensions might boil over
into a third World War. 177 By any conceivable measure, UNCLOS’s dispute
resolution system failed to mitigate that possibility.
The Philippines’s complaint, which encompassed over a dozen legal issues,
focused on four broad claims. First, the Philippines challenged China’s claim to
sovereignty over the entirety of the South China Sea (the so-called “Nine Dash
Line”) under UNCLOS. 178 Second, it asked the court to determine whether any
172
173
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land features claimed by China were entitled to their own territorial seas and
EEZs. 179 Third, it sought a declaratory judgment on the illegality of Chinese
actions, including interference with the Philippines’s use of resources in its own
EEZ and the infliction of harm on the maritime environment through
construction projects. 180 Finally, it asked the court to declare that China had
aggravated the dispute through a number of questionable tactics. 181 The intricacies
of the legal issues at stake are of less importance to this Comment than the
jurisdictional questions and have been covered at length elsewhere. 182 The key
consideration for this discussion was in China’s response: “the South China Sea
arbitration is null and void, and has no binding effect on China . . . The
Philippines’s attempt to negate China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights
and interests in the South China Sea through arbitral proceeding [sic] will lead to
nothing.” 183
Perhaps because of the significance of the case (especially when compared
to the rather small stakes involved in Arctic Sunrise), the Chinese government took
an aggressive stance on the question of the court’s jurisdiction. In its initial note
verbale in February, China expressed the argument it would maintain throughout
the course of the proceedings. 184 First, the core of the dispute was China’s and the
Philippines’s competing claims to sovereignty over the Spratly Islands. Because
the Convention assumes the sovereignty of the coastal state when establishing
179
180
181
182
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MIL. L. REV. 597, 600 (2016) (exploring the relationship between outstanding legal and security
issues); Emma Kingdon, Comment, A Case for Arbitration: The Philippines’ Solution for the South China
Sea Dispute, 38 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 129, 130 (evaluating the Philippines’s prospects for
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Landmark Ruling in South China Sea Arbitration, LAWFARE (July 12, 2016), https://perma.cc/HZM5QYV7 (providing an overview of each distinct claim contained within the award).
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territorial rights, it cannot resolve the fundamental disputes that underlie claims.
Second, both sides “agreed to settle the disputes through bilateral negotiation” in
the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. 185 The
Declaration was an agreement between China and the members of the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 186 By unilaterally removing the dispute
from bilateral negotiations, China argued, the Philippines had departed from “the
right track of settling disputes.” 187
After the PCA declined to dismiss the case outright, China published an
open position paper laying out its argument in greater detail, which the court
adopted in lieu of an official submission. 188 In addition to earlier arguments on
sovereignty and separate dispute resolution agreements, the paper added an
alternative argument that China’s 2006 declaration under Article 298 exempted it
from the resolution of disputes over maritime delimitation. 189 Because the
Philippines’s claim was really about sovereignty over islands, the arbitration was
tantamount to “a request for maritime delimitation by the Arbitral Tribunal in
disguise.” 190
After hearings and submissions from both the Philippines and observer
states from ASEAN, the court confirmed its jurisdiction to hear the case. Citing
both U.S. v. Nicaragua and Arctic Sunrise, the court first determined that China’s
refusal to participate did not impede the course of arbitration. 191 Second, it
rejected the notion that the dispute over sovereignty of the islands was the only
matter to be resolved, and that any collateral decision would necessarily (and
illicitly) resolve the larger question that was beyond the scope of the
Convention. 192 The Philippines had carefully selected the issues in its claim to limit
the arbitration to the boundaries of UNCLOS and the court’s jurisdiction. 193
Third, the court rejected China’s argument that the parties had a binding
agreement to settle disputes bilaterally. 194 Finally, the court found that seven of
the Philippines’s claims clearly did not fall within the Chinese exemption because
185
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they were unrelated to the types of activities articulated in Article 297, Paragraphs
1-3 (as in Arctic Sunrise). 195 However, it delayed ruling on jurisdiction over seven
other claims until the merits phase of the case in order to allow China to articulate
a fuller argument on the question of jurisdiction. 196
China responded by following Russia’s lead. Beijing asserted that “not
accepting or participating in arbitral proceedings is a right enjoyed by a sovereign
State. . . . For such a proceeding that is deliberately provocative, China has neither
the obligation nor the necessity to accept or participate in it.” 197 It declared that
the Philippines, which was “fully aware that it was absolutely not possible that
China would accept the compulsory arbitration . . . still decided to abuse the
provisions of the UNCLOS by unilaterally initiating and then pushing forward the
arbitral proceedings.” 198 China also chided “other States, who . . . [supported the
Philippines’s submission and] apparently have their ulterior motives.” 199
In the following months, China continued to stonewall the court as it
reached its decision. In the final award, released in July 2016, the court
unanimously endorsed the Philippines’s position. 200 China, however, maintained
course. In the months since the ruling, it has continued construction of artificial
islands in the Spratlys, dissuaded the new administration in Manila from pressing
the issue through diplomatic outreach, and increased its resistance to American
military presence in the area. 201

C. The United States
Unlike Russia and China, the U.S. is not a party to the Convention. Although
it signed the document, the Senate has steadfastly refused to ratify UNCLOS in
the face of domestic opposition resulting both from economic concerns and
worries about ceding legal authority to an international tribunal. 202 Even though
the U.S. Navy has been a strong proponent of ratification and has assumed the
role of the Convention’s primary enforcer, it has failed to convince skeptics in
195
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Congress. 203 This status puts the United States in an awkward position: among the
Permanent Members of the U.N. Security Council, it is the only state that rejects
Part XV dispute resolution altogether. 204
That rejection stems in part from the aversion to international courts that
the United States developed in the 1980s. In 1986, the U.S. refused to participate
in legal proceedings over its support for the Contra rebellion against the ruling
Sandinista government in Nicaragua under customary international law. 205
Although the ICJ held in Nicaragua v. United States that the U.S. had violated
Nicaragua’s sovereignty, an American veto in the U.N. Security Council prevented
Nicaragua from enforcing the judgment in any meaningful way. 206 The experience
soured the American public to international courts, later leading the U.S. to reject
the Rome Statute and participation in the International Criminal Court in 2002. 207
It is important to note that, despite its central role in building the post-war
liberal international order, it was the U.S. that first popularized the rejection of
international courts and binding agreements including UNCLOS. 208 Although
other countries did not follow the American approach for several decades, the
U.S.’s refusal to participate in the Nicaragua case set a direct precedent for Russia
in M/V Arctic Sunrise and China in The South China Sea Arbitration.
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D. The Future of Binding Dispute Resolution under UNCLOS
Taken together, the developments in Arctic Sunrise and The South China Sea
Arbitration may portend difficulties for Part XV in the future. If China, Russia, and
the U.S. all reject the system’s legitimacy when the issues are unfavorable to them,
other states will have little incentive to submit to resolution of their disputes if the
results do not suit their interests. Although these cases may be isolated instances,
they seem to reinforce each other by providing a proven method of stonewalling
international tribunals behind Article 298 declarations. Because Russia and China
seem to have suffered no consequences for their actions, it will be difficult for
ITLOS and the PCA to hold other obstinate parties to task in the future.
In the last few months, Russia has withdrawn its support for the Rome
Statute and submission to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. 209
Meanwhile, China seized a U.S. Navy research drone operating just 50 nautical
miles off the Filipino coast in the South China Sea, outside its “Nine-Dash Line”
claim. 210 Both actions demonstrate continued and increased opposition on the part
of both countries to international law and the peaceful resolution of disputes. In
light of their positions in Arctic Sunrise and The South China Sea Arbitration, this
behavior seems to establish a pattern of contempt for international legal authority.
A change in the American position would act as a strong counterweight to
the Russian and Chinese approach. By ratifying UNCLOS, the U.S. would lend
greater legitimacy to its Navy’s perennial efforts to enforce the agreement against
both its allies and its adversaries. Additionally, participation would enable
American jurists and legal scholars to join the benches of the various forums that
hear Part XV cases and influence the development of international maritime law.
The United States could enhance the mechanism’s credibility with smaller powers
by using it to resolve one of its minor outstanding disputes with Canada. 211 Such
a move would have minimal economic or territorial consequences, regardless of
the outcome, but have strong symbolic value as an endorsement of international
law.
However, the Trump Administration seems unlikely to push the Senate for
ratification. Its skeptical approach to international trade agreements and alliances
suggests that it would have little enthusiasm for a renewed commitment to
international law, especially if the public were to perceive the move as a cession
of sovereignty to a foreign body. 212 Without a renewed American commitment,
209
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smaller States Parties will be more likely to dare to adopt the Russian and Chinese
approach. Because Part XV has no capable enforcement mechanism, it is likely to
fall into disuse for all but the most routine law enforcement cases.

V. C ONCLUSION
This Comment has shown that UNCLOS Part XV has facilitated the
resolution of a considerable number of maritime disputes through its relatively
complex mechanisms for choice of forum. In the areas of law enforcement and
border disputes, it has contributed to a substantive development of international
law in its two decades of existence. While some of the design features do not
operate in the ways in which their framers intended, Part XV provides useful
forums to resolve lingering disputes through a peaceful process.
However, the last few years have seen the emergence of a plot twist: a
worrying trend of refusal to participate in that process by great powers. As Russia
and then China adopted the American approach to international courts, they
undercut the system’s effectiveness and denied justice to their smaller, less
powerful neighbors. China’s aggressive campaign to co-opt a new political
administration in the Philippines, combined with its continued military activities
in the disputed area, is particularly damaging to the practice of binding dispute
resolution among nations. With three of the five permanent members of the U.N.
Security Council opposed to jurisdiction of UNCLOS tribunals, smaller states
have little incentive to abide by their international commitments. Although the
U.S. signaled a willingness to change its approach in recent years, the inauguration
of a new administration seems likely to adopt the skepticism toward international
courts of administrations dating back to the mid-1980s. While the system will
likely continue to function in the short-term, the next contentious case may spell
its end.
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VI. A PPENDIX
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